The Myth of Lone-Wolf Terrorism

Politicians, government officials, and the media are often quick to describe the recent murderous attacks in Europe and America as the work of individuals who either commit violence for largely personal reasons or are inspired by reading jihadist propaganda online. In truth, argues Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, most have been recruited by Islamic State (IS) and have received operational assistance:

Jihadists plotting murders in the West used to congregate in person, meeting in small groups in underground mosques, houses, or other discreet locations. Radicalization occurred through in-person contact. Counterterrorism officials looked for physical hubs of recruitment, tapping phones and scanning videos for evidence that cells were meeting.

But with the social-media boom and the growth in encrypted communications, [both] radicalization and operational planning can easily take place entirely online. IS has capitalized on [developing] communications technologies, building cohesive online communities that foster a sense of “remote intimacy” and thus facilitate radicalization. The group has also established a team of “virtual planners” who use the Internet to identify recruits and to coordinate and direct attacks, often without meeting the perpetrators in person. [For instance], Junaid Hussain, a British IS operative who was killed in August 2015, played the role of virtual planner for the May 2015 strike against the “draw Mohammed ” contest in Garland, Texas.

Read more at Defend Democracy

More about: Europe, ISIS, Politics & Current Affairs, Terrorism, U.S. Security

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF