Examining three locales in the West Bank nominally under PA jurisdiction—the Hebron area, Nablus, and Ramallah—Pinhas Inbari finds that alternative sources of authority are challenging the rule of Mahmoud Abbas and the PA, with rival groups and villages moving in different political directions:

In Hebron . . . the large clans . . . have [joined forces], reestablished the Tribal Council of Mount Hebron [that existed in the pre-Oslo days], and sent a delegation to Amman to express loyalty to the king of Jordan under the Jordanian flag.

In Ramallah, the PA’s de-facto seat of government, Europe seeks to organize a phalanx of “non-governmental” organizations (NGOs) as a political force. This effort is opposed by the PA, which wants the NGOs to be under its control. . . . Nablus, for its part, has gone into a tailspin of total anarchy. It is under the rule of gangs, with exchanges of gunfire in the heart of the city and attempts at political assassinations. . . .

[There is also the case of] Sei’r, [in the vicinity of Hebron, which] is considered a “Fatah village.” It is [under the control] of Abbas Zaki, a member of the Fatah central committee and one of the more extreme Fatah figures; he calls for forging ties with Iran. Indeed, the highest number of knife attackers who met their deaths came from Sei’r.

However, . . . when the militant governor of Hebron, Kamel Hmeid, came to the village to praise it for its “sacrifice,” he was surprised to find that the village notables had summoned him to a discussion behind closed doors in which they demanded that he stop sending the youths of the village to their deaths. Indeed, since then, the village of Sei’r has ceased to dispatch knife attackers. . . .

Nevertheless, the Islamic parties set the tone in Hebron.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.