Earlier this month, Nusra Front, the main al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, renamed itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham in a public statement that, on its face, would indicate a break with its parent organization. This fits neatly with the conventional wisdom that al-Qaeda has become a second-tier player, unable to keep up with the more popular and powerful Islamic State (IS). But, argue Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, the conventional wisdom is wrong: al-Qaeda has routed Islamic State in Africa, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan while establishing important footholds in Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere; meanwhile, the renaming of Nusra Front was likely mostly for show:

Rather than trying to replicate IS’s model, al-Qaeda took the exact opposite approach. Al-Qaeda reduced its public profile, downplayed its successes rather than publicizing them, and embedded further within local populations. In this way, al-Qaeda presented itself to the world as a more palatable alternative to its bloodthirsty rival. . . .

Even when IS was at its peak, the vast majority of al-Qaeda affiliates refused to defect, and instead hunted down and neutralized IS sympathizers. Now that IS is demonstrably losing territory in Syria, Iraq, and Libya all at once, its chances of wooing al-Qaeda affiliates are even further diminished. It is IS’s global network, not al-Qaeda’s, that is now vulnerable to fragmentation. . . .

The alleged dissociation from al-Qaeda [in Syria] may open up [the newly minted] Jabhat Fath al-Sham to deeper cooperation with other rebel groups and greater support from external sponsors. Al-Qaeda theoreticians have made clear that they expect this precise benefit. . . .

Today al-Qaeda seems to be the strongest it has been since 9/11, and is arguably in the best shape it has known in its history.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.