According to a recent survey of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, slim majorities—53 percent of Israelis and 51 percent of Palestinians—support a two-state solution in principle. But when pollsters add questions about the compromises needed to implement such a plan—over Jerusalem, security measures, the Temple Mount, and the return of refugees—the majorities quickly became minorities. Elliott Abrams looks at what the data mean for the future of the peace process:

Relentless optimists have long argued that Israel and the Palestinians are an inch apart and, as former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta put it in 2011, peace can be attained if they would “just get to the damn table.” Wrong. . . .

There are some other interesting findings [in this poll]. . . . [I]f a peace deal would mean peace with all the Arab states, 26 percent of Israeli Jews would change their negative view and vote yes. And . . . 29 percent of Palestinians would change their minds and accept a deal if the new Palestinian state and Jordan became a confederation. It’s interesting that the pollsters included this sensitive question, and remarkable that confederation with Jordan is viewed positively by so many Palestinians.

The old Palestinian Authority/PLO leadership in Ramallah doesn’t want to talk about such a possibility, for many reasons. Their gravy train would end if the Jordanian government ran things. And the idea that every Palestinian heart pines for sovereignty in a separate Palestinian state, which has been the key PLO position for decades, is obviously undermined by finding that Palestinians may be more pragmatic than their “leaders” about what the future may hold.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.