According to the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Islamic Republic is allowed to continue research and development on more advanced nuclear centrifuges. In 2024 it will be able to begin using these, and in 2026 it can enrich as much uranium as it wants, short of levels suitable for making atomic weapons. By 2031, all restrictions will be lifted. The results, writes Ephraim Asculai, are that even without cheating, Iran can gradually abbreviate the amount of time it would require to start producing nuclear weapons:

[I]f Iran abides by the agreement to the letter, by the eighth year, if not before, Iran can have perfected one or more centrifuge models capable of high rates of enrichment. Iran would be in a situation in which it had already prepared the capacity to produce as many centrifuges as it wants and at the rate of production it chooses, even if not actually producing these before the eighth year.

By year ten, Iran’s breakout time will already have been reduced considerably; and by year fifteen Iran is officially permitted to do all it wants, including significant amounts of enrichment to military levels (around 90 percent). The breakout times will then be measured by weeks, not months. . . .

Iran knows how to be patient. There should be little doubt that unless something dramatic changes in the Iranian regime or its policies, it will seek this nuclear capability.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.