Last week, an Israeli news network announced the finding of substantial evidence that the Palestinian Authority president had been recruited by Soviet intelligence during the 1980s and that his handler was none other than Mikhail Bogdanov—currently Vladimir Putin’s envoy to the Middle East at a time when Russia is intervening to broker talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Jonathan Tobin considers the significance of these revelations:

If the PA leader were to confound observers and summon up the courage to embrace peace and recognize the legitimacy of a Jewish state no matter its borders, then nothing in his past would prevent him from obtaining extensive concessions from the current Israeli government or any possible successor. . . .

[T]he connection with the anti-Semitic Soviet leadership was always more than an alliance of convenience for men like [Yasir] Arafat and Abbas. . . .

[Likewise], the rejectionism of the Palestinians wasn’t merely a strategy but an expression of their identity. Their [leaders’ sense of] national purpose was and still is inextricably linked to their century-old war against the Zionists. If men like Abbas can’t rise above their sordid past and make peace, it is not just a matter of habit, but also a natural consequence of the political culture steeped in hate that they have helped create.

Being a former Soviet agent doesn’t prevent Abbas from making peace. But it does supply a partial explanation for why he refuses to do it.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.