On Wednesday, the Wall Street Journal reported that in addition to the previously revealed cash payment to the Islamic Republic of $400 million—apparently given as ransom for American hostages—the U.S. paid an additional $1.3 billion, likewise delivered in planeloads of cash. The White House has continued to claim that these funds were owed to Iran because of a 1979 arms sale that fell through and, furthermore, that the sum of $1.7 billion is preferable to any verdict likely be handed down if the case were to go before the tribunal for such claims at The Hague. Meanwhile, Rick Richman writes, not only has the administration failed to disclose its calculations but the payments might be flatly prohibited by U.S. law:

The State Department’s response [to formal congressional inquiries made in February] noted that the United States “has a significant [related] counterclaim against Iran.” . . . But the administration has declined to explain the nature and amount of its counterclaim, or why it paid Iran’s claim and left its own counterclaim for future litigation.

Moreover, the administration had more than $400 million in other claims against Iran, arising under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), for court judgments against Iran for terrorist attacks against Americans. That law specifically provided that “no funds shall be paid to Iran . . . from the Foreign Military Sales Fund until [such claims] have been dealt with to the satisfaction of the United States.”

In a January 29 letter, Senator Roy Blunt asked why the administration had paid Iran its claim before Iran satisfied the VTVPA claims—which total $465 million plus interest. The administration responded it had resolved the VTVPA claims “by securing a favorable resolution on the interest owed” Iran. But in a June 1 letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, Royce computed the maximum Iranian claim arising out of the 1979 payment as $1.8 billion before considering any offsets in American claims against Iran.

We currently don’t know whether, after such offsets, the United States owed Iran anything at all. . . . But the administration hasn’t disclosed how it calculated its payment, or the amount of its counterclaim, or how the VTVPA claims were resolved by the payment, or why the administration thought Iran would prevail in a lawsuit that surely would have considered counterclaims.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.