Reading reports of Russian warplanes reducing the Syrian city to rubble, Oliver Bullough is reminded of Vladimir Putin’s bombardment of the Chechen capital, Grozny, at the beginning of the century:

Putin knows now, as he knew [during the war in Chechnya], that he and his proxies can’t win on the ground, so they are trying to solve their problem from the air. Where infantry won’t go, he’s dropping explosives.

Putin is not alone in this, of course. Western leaders also try to solve complex issues without risking close contact. But Putin has an advantage over his rivals. There are almost no journalists, politicians, or activists in Russia pushing him to spare Aleppo’s civilians, just as there was never much sympathy in Russia for civilians trapped in Grozny while rockets were smashing the city. . . .

Those of us who visited the city afterward were stunned by the destruction. It had become acres of shattered buildings, scrunched factories, and shredded fences. Today some suggest—as Russia has—that Western states are just as bad. But they aren’t. They can’t be: any Western government that did what Putin did to Grozny, or is doing to Aleppo, would fall, and would deserve to. . . .

Although Putin need not worry about domestic opinion, he cares desperately about what the world thinks of him. . . . If he succeeds in imposing peace in Syria, even at the cost of leveling Aleppo, he will try to legitimize his victory. He will do that by giving it the outward trappings of a real, democratic peace process: of a Northern Ireland, or a South Africa. . . .

In the years after Putin started his Chechen war in 1999, he had Chechnya’s leaders killed and imposed peace via a local strongman. The savagery necessary to maintain order has since driven out at least one-third of the prewar Chechen population, with most of them seeking asylum in Europe. The exodus continues today. Chechnya still requires vast annual subsidies from Moscow, and its peace remains just one assassination away from chaos.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.