Although Hizballah’s military and terrorist operations are planned and conducted entirely by men, the organization relies on the support of a large number of Lebanese women who depend on the social services it provides, often get jobs working for its civilian institutions, are supported by the paychecks of their husbands or sons who are Hizballah fighters, and can expect a lifetime stipend if these fighters are “martyred.” But as the fighting in Syria takes its toll, social services and compensation for the families of “martyrs” have been cut, and young widows are being pressured by the organization into a form of legal prostitution in which they are “assigned” to terrorists on leave. Increasingly, writes Hanin Ghaddar, these developments have led to friction:

Hizballah’s institutions constitute an alternative economic structure that hires and attracts [both] men and women. A girl in Hizballah’s community is brought up in the organization’s schools. She is expected to work in Hizballah institutions, marry a Hizballah fighter, and promote Hizballah’s values both outside and inside her family. The “Party of God” knows that a disciplined and committed woman can raise disciplined and committed fighters. It is a system that physically reproduces itself.

But the endless war in Syria is producing cracks in the system, and women are no longer as engaged as they used to be—or being compensated for their sacrifices the way that men are. . . . [T]he wives of the new recruits . . . are not necessarily Hizballah members and are generally not committed to the ideology or the war, but they are part of the community that the party allegedly is protecting. They are mostly from poor families. [If widowed], these women tend to suffer [the most] financially. . . .

Women are Hizballah’s main internal problem. The war in Syria means they are losing sons, brothers, and husbands. It is marginalizing their role in the party, and pushing the poorest among them to the edge of survival. . . . The communal frustration and inequities that the war continues to exacerbate and deepen may soon lead to an explosion.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.