While Israel’s navy played a crucial role in its victory in the Yom Kippur War and does much now to keep weapons shipments from arriving in Gaza, it has always been dwarfed by the other branches of the IDF. Seth Cropsey, who served as undersecretary of the Navy in two U.S. administrations, believes that the Jewish state will need to develop its maritime capabilities much more in the coming years—and that America has an interest in helping:

[Since the 1970s], Israeli [military] planners could rely on the U.S. Sixth Fleet to protect the Jewish state’s western border from seaborne attack. No more. The U.S. Sixth Fleet’s permanent presence today consists of a single command ship and four ballistic-missile defense destroyers based in Spain, outside the Mediterranean. . . .

Growing economic interests are likely to shift the Israeli military’s focus to the sea, which in turn will reveal the large security benefits a robust naval presence offers the Jewish state. . . . Even if Israel’s neighbors did not include Islamic State, an al-Qaeda affiliate, an Iranian terrorist group masquerading as a political party, and a Russian proxy regime, sea shipment is the only viable option for bulk goods. . . .

Aside from its deterrent value, seapower gives Israel greater conventional strategic depth and flexibility. . . . Increased seapower would [also] be useful in a conflict with Iran, and all the more applicable as the regime in Tehran uses new sources of wealth to extend its reach into the Red and Mediterranean Seas.

A strong navy and an Israeli government increasingly engaged with the sea support the common interest that Washington and Jerusalem have . . . in maintaining open navigation and free trade. The two share regional rivals (Iran foremost among them), and both benefit from political stability. The irregular threats that face Israel are also threats to the United States. When dealing with Russia and Turkey, low-end insurgencies like Islamic State and Hamas, and mixed threats like Hizballah and Iran, the U.S. benefits from a stronger Israeli navy.

The Israeli government’s greatest maritime challenge in the next decade will not be expanding its navy or cultivating external energy assets, but reframing its view of the sea. It faces a transition from an economic to a geostrategic view of the sea, and must take a hard look at the role of seapower in its national strategy.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.