After going two years without a president, Lebanon’s parliament selected Michel Aoun for the post on Monday. Aoun, a Christian, was once one of his country’s most anti-Syrian politicians; but since 2006, he and his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) have unabashedly sided with Syria, Hizballah, and Iran. While Tehran has, quite reasonably, proclaimed the election “a victory for Hizballah,” David Schenker notes that it is not a complete one:

Given current realities, Hizballah will continue to possess a massive arsenal of weapons outside the government’s authority for the foreseeable future. It will also continue deploying into Syria at will to fight on the Assad regime’s behalf, with or without Beirut’s consent. . . .

For these and other reasons, many in the United States and the region are declaring Aoun’s election a victory for Hizballah and Iran. Yet . . . it is difficult to imagine an Aoun presidency being worse for [the anti-Syrian] March 14 [alliance]—or for U.S. interests—than the ongoing vacuum. Aoun may even surpass the extremely low expectations for his presidency. . . . Most importantly, the agreement to elect him apparently received Saudi Arabia’s blessing [and] perhaps will spur Riyadh to reengage in Lebanese politics as a useful counterbalance to Iran. . . .

Finally, . . . with or without Aoun, Hizballah and Iran remain the country’s dominant political actors. Absent an effective U.S. policy that deals Tehran and its proxies a setback in Syria, Lebanon will remain on the precipice of crisis.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.