Yesterday the Israeli government announced the appointment of a new ambassador to Turkey, one of the final steps in implementing the reconciliation agreement the two countries reached in June. Yet whether Jerusalem and Ankara will be able to maintain their resurrected alliance depends on the latter’s involvement in the intricacies of internal Palestinian politics, which are themselves connected to the equally intricate web of Middle Eastern rivalries. Pinhas Inbari writes:

The [attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July] shed new light on Turkish-Palestinian relations. Fatah and Hamas expressed common support for Erdogan, while Palestinian leftist organizations linked to the Assad regime did not. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which favor Iran [and its Syrian ally], issued statements criticizing the Israeli-Turkish agreement, [as did] Fatah’s representative in Lebanon. . . .

Although Turkey and Iran are the two regional powers with the greatest influence on Hamas, instead of coordinating their influence, they fight over it. The struggle between Turkey and Iran has also divided Hamas between Turkey-supporters and Iran-supporters, with the pro-Turkish leadership linked to the West Bank and the pro-Iranian leadership situated in Gaza and Lebanon. . . .

The Hamas official most identified with Turkey is [the current politburo chief] Khaled Mashal. . . . Turkey’s support for Mashal has come to the fore in the initiation and planning of West Bank terror attacks. Mashal’s right-hand man Saleh al-Aruri . . . has been the guiding hand of the attacks. . . . Israel insisted that Turkey close the Hamas offices in its borders and expel Aruri and his associates. It is not clear whether this has really happened. New reports suggest that the office still exists. . . .

The real difficulty likely to arise between Turkey and Israel, however, concerns east Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. Turkey has ties with the most extreme elements, such as the former mufti Akrama Sabri, inciter Raed Salah, and Hamas. If it decides to protect them against Israel [in order] to assume leadership of the “al-Aqsa is in danger” campaign, thereby promoting its status as a regional Islamic power, Israel will find itself facing a problem.

Thus, the future of Israeli-Turkish relations depends on the question: will the reconciliation with Israel, along with the lessons of the failed rebellion against him, lead Erdogan to be less “Islamic” and more “Turkish?” In other words, will he prefer Turkey’s interests as a state to those of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.