How Not to Repeat Past Mistakes on Iran

Since the Islamic Republic’s creation in 1979, writes Ray Takeyh, American policymakers have repeatedly erred by trying to play “moderates” vs. “hardliners” while shying away from using—or threatening to use—force. Donald Trump would do well to learn from his predecessors’ failures as well as their successes:

Iran should be treated as a unitary nation-state and not a collection of hardliners and moderates that American policy can manipulate to its advantage. The entire notion of Iranian factionalism must be reconsidered in the aftermath of the 2009 revolt, when the theocratic state purged the reformers from its midst. . . .

The George W. Bush administration provides a good case study in what works and what does not. America’s momentary military triumph in displacing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein unsettled the clerical regime, and Iran quickly suspended its nuclear program in 2003. Bush’s forceful denunciation of states that sponsor terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction was well-noted in Tehran. And yet, the administration soon fell into the quagmire of negotiations. By 2005, America set aside its forceful posture and sought to engage Iran in stabilizing Iraq and settling the nuclear issue. An Islamic Republic at ease with its revived fortunes responded by accelerating its nuclear activities and lacerating American forces in Iraq with its lethal Shiite militias.

The next lesson to remember is that the Islamic Republic is not interested in normalizing relations with the United States. For the past four decades, American presidents have hoped that offers of dialogue and the possibility of resumed relations would entice Iran into moderation. . . . The point that many White Houses have missed is that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary state whose entire identity is invested in its hostility toward the West. For the clerical rulers, resumed relations with America are themselves an existential threat.

Read more at Politico

More about: Donald Trump, George W. Bush, Iran, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF