A favorite trope of anti-Semites, especially on the left, is that there was an underlying affinity between Zionists and Nazis (both wanted to get Jews out of Europe), and that Zionists were somehow guilty of collaboration. Like so many libels, this one contains a grain of truth: the Zionist leadership negotiated with the Nazi regime to get permission for over 30,000 German Jews to come to Palestine. But in reality this was but a desperate measure on the part of the Yishuv to save some Jews when the world was closing its doors to refugees. Furthermore, explains Samuel Miner, Nazi Germany was not at all well-disposed to the establishment of a Jewish state, and was eager to kill Jews in the Middle East:

Between January and July 1942, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel led the newly formed Afrika Korps across North Africa toward the British-held Suez Canal. . . . [H]ad Rommel succeeded in capturing Egypt, an Einsatzgruppe [an SS mobile killing unit], created in order to murder the Jews of Palestine, would have been activated. In July of 1942, the unit, consisting of 24 men, flew to Greece. Had Rommel won the first battle of El Alamein, the unit would have been sent to Egypt and neighboring Palestine to conduct its genocidal project. . . . However, Rommel’s defeats . . . as well as the Allied landing in French North Africa prevented the spread of the Holocaust to Palestine. . . .

Remarkably, archival documents show that months after the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa, the Luftwaffe actually considered a proposal to bomb Jerusalem and Tel Aviv on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration in November 1943. This plan, proposed by Arab nationalist leader and Nazi collaborator Amin al-Husseini and supported by Heinrich Himmler’s Reich Main Security Office [which controlled the SS and administered the Holocaust] was turned down in summer of 1943 by Hermann Göring, [who was commander of the Luftwaffe]. . . .

[However], the Luftwaffe did consider . . . bombing [Palestine] in 1943, and again in 1944. By then, there were no Axis forces operating anywhere near the Middle East. Furthermore, Luftwaffe planners openly admitted that there were no major industrial targets in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, or Haifa. The position paper [advocating the bombings] concluded that “Tel Aviv is undoubtedly a place where we can consider retaliating against the British-American terror bombing [of Germany].” This sentiment reflected the Nazis’ conspiratorial worldview, . . . as they believed Jews were in control in London and Washington, as well as Moscow. . . . The Nazi war against the Western powers and the Soviet Union was a war against the Jews.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.