According to the book of Kings, the Israelite kingdom was split into two after the death of Solomon: the kingdom of Israel (later known as Samaria), consisting of the ten northern tribes, and the kingdom of Judah, consisting of the two tribes to the south. Ron E. Tappy describes what archaeological sources suggest about the northern kingdom:

A triangle of three cities—Shechem, Tirzah, and Samaria—lay near the center of this area and served as [its] religious and political center. . . . Around 884 BCE, King Omri of Israel purchased the family-owned estate of a man named Shemer, made it his political capital, and called the new city Samaria (Hebrew, Shomron). Throughout its existence, Samaria remained small in size—more a royal compound than a multifaceted city. . . . Until the fall of Israel in 721 BCE, Samaria remained that kingdom’s political hub. . . .

Omri’s son, Ahab, ruled after him (circa 873–851 BCE) and was one of Israel’s most powerful kings. . . . The Hebrew Bible obliquely praises and criticizes the lavish royal houses purportedly constructed by Ahab. Excavators have recovered a staggering quantity of ivory objects, sculptures, wall panels, furniture trim, and glass inlays from Samaria’s summit. These items reflect Israelite, Phoenician, and Egyptian artistic motifs with some direct parallels to ivories found in the contemporaneous Assyrian capital, Nimrud. The presence of unworked tusks suggests that Samaria might even have been a production center for these carvings. . . . Such conspicuous opulence undoubtedly inflamed orthodox [followers of the biblical God] like Elijah and [other] early prophets. . . .

Taken together, the biblical and extra-biblical evidence suggests a degree of religious pluralism at Samaria that would have enraged the orthodox establishment in Israel. In its broader world, Samaria seems to have maintained a kind of controlled syncretism, adopting elements of a variety of religious beliefs and practices, [and thus worshipping God alongside Baal, Asherah, and other Canaanite deities].

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.