Donald Trump’s promises to relocate the American embassy to Israel’s capital have been met by prophecies of doom from many pundits and so-called experts. Supposedly it will cause Palestinians to riot, harm Israel’s improving ties with Sunni Arab states, and bring the hostility of the Muslim world down on the U.S. Not only are these predictions ill-founded, writes Miriam Elman, but the move could help advance the peace process:

As has long been noted by scholars [of conflict resolution], the perception of a party’s will and commitment is essential to peacemaking. Demands and offers need to be believable, and concrete actions can display a readiness to react.

Though some Arab states may protest, official relations between Israel and its neighbors have never been better as they face down common threats, from Islamist extremism to an expanding Iranian influence. . . . [Furthermore], while the international community hadn’t previously recognized Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem, the [recent UN Security Council] resolution actually commits the world to recognizing the western half of the city as part of the state of Israel, making Trump’s campaign promise more feasible than before.

Critics are right that an embassy move could spark demonstrations and perhaps even in other forms of retribution, undermining the shaky Palestinian Authority. But Jerusalem has already faced a wave of violence in recent months, and the potential for future clashes isn’t sufficient cause for delay. For the moment, Mahmoud Abbas would probably be able to control any fallout after emerging considerably stronger since last week’s Security Council vote and the Fatah central-party elections earlier this month.

[A] reversal of the longtime U.S. diplomatic boycott of Jerusalem could bode well for Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects. Sending a strong message that the new administration stands with the Israeli government on a major symbolic issue with high potential costs could push the Palestinian leadership to a greater sense of urgency in negotiations.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.