An Alternative to Creating a Doomed-to-Fail Palestinian State

Recent history suggests that a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would be as subject to internal political, sectarian, and ideological conflict as the teetering, or already collapsed, states that make up much of the Middle East. Lawrence Solomon advocates a new approach based on negotiations with Palestinian leaders who actually represent the interests of their own communities:

Yasir Arafat never [succeeded in forging] a united people—most Palestinians only grudgingly accepted the rule of his Palestinian Authority (PA), and some never did. Few Palestinians identify chiefly with a national identity; their loyalty instead is clan-based—[a loyalty] to the tight-knit group of extended families that share the same ancestry, based on the father’s male line, and a preference for marrying within the clan. Palestinians pledge loyalty to their clan in a binding, formal code of honor backed by local militias. An attack on one clan member is an attack on all members.

Clan-based systems of governance do not lend themselves to nation states. Little surprise, then, that after Arafat died, civil war broke out and Gaza broke off from the West Bank to form its own statelet. To make dicier still the notion of a coherent Palestinian nation whose people share common values, Gaza is theocratic, run by Hamas, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, while the West Bank is largely secular. . . .

Without foreign funds, the PA would not only be unable to fund its continued support for terrorists, it would be unable to maintain itself in power by dispensing patronage to its supporters, and it would be unable to maintain its claim to being the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The weaker the Palestinian Authority becomes, the stronger the clans become in relation, allowing them to reassert their authority, and thus appoint legitimate representatives to negotiate a settlement with the Israelis.

[Working with clan leaders rather than the PA] could form the basis for lasting self-government determined organically by the Arabs of Palestine, unlike a single Arab state based on the pretense of a unified Palestinian people. No other governance model—at least none with a chance of surviving long—is remotely plausible.

Read more at National Post

More about: Israel & Zionism, Palestinian statehood, Peace Process, Yasir Arafat

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security