Hizballah’s Relations with Iran Are Under Increasing Strain

Hanin Ghaddar, after interviewing a number of Hizballah fighters and commanders, sees ample evidence of their exasperation with their Iranian patrons, on whose behalf they have been fighting in Syria:

[I]n the early days of the war, the Hizballah-Iran dynamic changed quickly. The group’s commanders had already been working under the supervision of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for years, but [the commander of IRGC’s expeditionary wing Qasem] Soleimani reportedly began micromanaging their military operations to an unprecedented degree. This shift, coupled with Soleimani’s strict command over the consolidated Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani Shiite militias fighting in Syria, highlighted the complex relations between Persian and Arab Shiites. [Shiite] unity has been challenged by deep-rooted Persian-Arab tensions. . . .

Similarly, a number of . . . fighters have complained of being abandoned by their Iranian and Iraqi Shiite allies on the battlefield. Such incidents apparently led to many losses among Hizballah’s ranks, and some fighters subsequently refused to fight under Iranian commanders. Likewise, many interviewees complained about the “stingy” and “arrogant” manner in which Iranians treat Arab fighters.

Meanwhile, Ghaddar writes, Hizballah is losing some of its popularity among its Lebanese Shiite base, with possible consequences for Israel:

One thing that could revive Shiite public support for Hizballah at home is a confrontation with Israel. Although all-out war is not in the cards at the moment, post-Aleppo military operations in Syria have brought Hizballah forces back to Lebanon’s borders, creating an opportunity for renewed anti-Israel rhetoric and provocations.

Alternatively, if Washington turns up the heat on Hizballah amid increasing U.S.-Iranian tensions, the group may try to cast itself as a victim in order to regain public support. America’s interests would therefore be better served if its future actions against Hizballah included a plan for exploiting the fissures and contradictions within the Shiite community, e.g., by creating economic and employment alternatives for potential recruits. Otherwise, Hizballah will no doubt use any confrontation to bring the Shiites back to their sectarian base.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Hizballah, Iran, Israeli Security, Lebanon, Politics & Current Affairs, Syrian civil war

 

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security