Lone-wolf terrorists, we are often told, constitute the new face of Islamist terror. These young men read about the activities of Islamic State (IS) on the Internet, perhaps pick up a few bomb-making tips from IS publications, and are then inspired to carry out massacres. However, writes Rukmini Callimachi, this story doesn’t describe how IS generally operates. Instead, its “cyberplanners” carefully recruit potential attackers via social media and then give them long-distance coaching, training, and instructions as to how to plan and execute attacks. One such cyberplanner, a Sudanese citizen known as Abu Issa al-Amriki, had his hand in numerous plots before he was killed in Syria by an American airstrike last April:

At the same time that he was recruiting [potential terrorists in Hyderabad], Amriki was grooming attackers in Canada and Britain, as well as at least three other young men in suburbs across America. . . . They included a former member of the Army National Guard living in Virginia, a warehouse worker from Columbus, and Emanuel L. Lutchman, a twenty-five-year-old in Rochester.

Looking for ways to get to Syria, Lutchman reached out to Amriki on December 25, 2015, asking what it was like to live inside territory controlled by the group. “Dream come true,” Amriki responded, before telling the young man that the Syrian border had been closed. Instead, the handler suggested that Lutchman carry out an attack right at home on New Year’s Eve—less than a week after their first exchange. Plan an “operation” and kill “1,000,000s of kuffar,” Amriki instructed him, using a derogatory Arabic word meaning infidel. Over the course of several chats via the [encrypted electronic-communication service] Telegram, they planned how Lutchman would attack a bar serving craft beer to celebrate the holiday. . . .

The two men discussed recruiting three other “brothers” to take part. They stayed in contact as Lutchman went to Walmart, where he spent $40 on two ski masks, two knives, a machete, zip-ties, duct tape, and latex gloves. He planned to abduct one of the bar’s customers and videotape himself killing the victim, prosecutors say. And they exchanged a flurry of messages as the twenty-five-year-old began to voice doubts and the handler assumed the role of therapist, patiently listening and reassuring him.

Lutchman was arrested at his home the day before his planned attack on Merchants Grill in Rochester, outed by the accomplice he had recruited, who turned out to be an FBI informant.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.