On January 29, Tehran tested a medium-range ballistic missile and then announced plans to continue with further tests. The Islamic Republic argues that such tests are permitted under the terms of the nuclear deal, which skirted the issue of delivery systems for nuclear weapons, and under the terms of Security Council Resolution 2231, which gives the deal the stamp of international law and in which “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” Olli Heinonen explains:
In the language of the UN, “calling” is weaker than the phrasing of [earlier] resolutions that “decide” that Iran shall not conduct activity “related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”
The language of Resolution 2231 was largely negotiated between Iran and the U.S., meaning both sides must have an agreed understanding as to the meaning of [the phrase] “designed to be capable.” This definition should be disclosed to clarify the resolution’s scope. The JCPOA, [as the deal is officially known], is a complex agreement, and its negotiators concluded side agreements to clarify some of its arrangements. Some of the side deals . . . were made public shortly before the U.S. presidential transition. Others, like those on possible military dimensions [of nuclear research] and Iran’s uranium-enrichment research and development, remain under wraps.
According to Iranian news reports, unwritten agreements may also have been reached. . . . Disclosure of the understandings related to Resolution 2231 is important, especially in light of German reports that on January 29, Iran may have also tested a “Sumar” cruise missile that is considered nuclear-capable. Sumar’s design work was known at the time of the JCPOA negotiations, so it is essential to understand whether this matter was discussed during the talks, and if so, why Resolution 2231 makes no mention of cruise missiles. . . .
If the testing of ballistic and cruise missiles is covered by Resolution 2231, those provisions should be implemented and Iran held to account. If the resolution’s provisions do not cover such activities, the Security Council should issue a new resolution explicitly banning them and ensure that there are long-term restrictions in place for the time when Iran is capable of producing fissile material in just a matter of weeks.
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