In recent weeks, Hamas sent two delegations to Cairo for meetings with high-ranking Egyptian officials, suggesting a thaw in the frosty relations of the past few years. If reports are correct, Hamas, in exchange for Cairo’s reopening trade through the Rafah crossing, agreed to cease cooperation with Islamic State and other jihadist groups in the Sinai Peninsula that have been making war on Egypt. Hamas also seems to have agreed to allow Cairo to serve as a mediator between it and the Palestinian Authority as well as between it and Israel. Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter explore the implications:

The emerging understanding between Egypt and Hamas . . . reflects political pragmatism at this specific point in time, but should not be interpreted at this stage as a profound strategic change on either side. Egypt’s softened stance toward Hamas does not moderate the struggle being conducted by the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood, [Hamas’s parent organization]. Similarly, Hamas’s willingness to accept some of Egypt’s security demands does not constitute a retreat from its commitment . . . to conflict with Israel. [A] considerable degree of suspicion, skepticism, and distrust still prevails between the two sides. . . .

From Israel’s perspective, the turnabout in Egypt-Hamas relations constitutes an important test for the flourishing security cooperation between Israel and Egypt, which face shared terrorist challenges in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. In the framework of this coordination, Israel must ensure that the security understandings taking shape between Egypt and Hamas do not leave the latter a “legitimate” opening for weapons smuggling, with Egypt turning a blind eye—intentionally or not—to a military buildup aimed against Israel. . . .

At the same time, if the understanding between Egypt and Hamas conforms to Israel’s security requirements, it is likely to serve Israel’s interests in several aspects. First, it can relieve the humanitarian distress in the Gaza Strip, which can affect Israel and the continuation of which is liable to fuel a new military outbreak with Hamas. Second, it can undermine the reciprocal relations between Hamas and the Salafist-jihadist groups in Sinai, which constitute a possible threat to Israel’s security and an obstacle to Egypt’s efforts to attain internal stability and improve its economic situation. Third, enhancing Hamas’s dependence on Egypt will weaken the organization’s motivation to begin a military conflict with Israel, and will reinforce Egypt’s status as an effective mediator capable of bringing a swift end to future crises.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.