Renewing the “Jordanian Option” for the West Bank

While Amman has for some time endorsed Palestinian statehood in the West Bank, thus implicitly relinquishing its claims to the territory, Hillel Frisch and Yitzḥak Sokoloff argue that the Hashemite monarchy might still be willing to play a role in creating some alternative resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The first step would be American and Arab investment in making the kingdom strong and prosperous:

The gravitational force of a prosperous Jordan would expand the functional links that have always existed between the cities of the West Bank and Amman. It would encourage Palestinians in the West Bank to look to ties with Jordan as the best guarantee of their political and economic future. Because of this, Jordan has the potential (once again) to become a major stabilizing influence on Palestinian politics, which would serve the interests of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian people.

The reemergence of a Jordanian role in the disposition of the West Bank is much preferable to the current international fixation on the concept of an independent, contiguous Palestinian state with borders based on the 1967 lines. Such a state would be no less of a long-term strategic threat today than it was before the Oslo Accords. So, too, is Palestinian irredentism a threat to Jordan’s security. . . .

A strong and stable Jordan could provide an alternative to the model of a two-state solution that depends on the Palestinian Authority. Such a vision will not only attenuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, [but] will [also] bolster Jordan, whose importance to regional stability has never been so crucial. . . .

The Saudis and the Gulf states should provide [Jordan with financial backing]. The U.S. should prod them to do so for their own good, but also to reciprocate for the American security umbrella under which they have been living ever since Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait. . . . Regionally, Jordan has never been a more important strategic asset for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies or more worthy of investment. It defends what remains of these states’ northern flank against Syrian-Iranian encroachment and helps balance the threat Shiite Iraq poses to Saudi Arabia’s eastern border, critically close to its major oil fields.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Israel & Zionism, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Two-State Solution, U.S. Foreign policy, West Bank

Israel Just Sent Iran a Clear Message

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.

Read more at Jewish Chronicle

More about: Iran, Israeli Security