The Future of Iraq after Islamic State

After three months of intense fighting, the Iraqi army and its allies have successfully retaken the crucial city of Mosul from Islamic State (IS); currently a pause is in effect before they will cross the Tigris and try to subdue the eastern part of the city. Jonathan Spyer, having recently visited Mosul, does not doubt that they will win, but sees little hope of peace or national reconciliation:

It is an under-reported fact that the [Iranian-backed militias known as] “popular mobilization units” (PMU) are in the city, though not in the form of the well-known Iran-associated militias such as Kataib Hizballah and the Badr Organization. The PMU includes fighters from small Shiite communities in the Nineveh area [to which Mosul belongs], including members of the Turkmen and Shabak ethnic groups. . . . The PMU also includes a 40,000-strong Sunni component, consisting mainly of members of Sunni tribes who cooperate closely with the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government. I witnessed the presence of these fighters in the central part of Mosul.

These forces are under the overall command of the PMU, which is led in the field by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a well-known Shiite Islamist figure close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. In the assessment of one Iraqi official I spoke to, the PMU is “all over” the offensive against IS in the Nineveh province.

Beyond the specific question of the PMU, representatives of . . . the [Iraqi] armed forces indignantly deny that their forces are operating on anything resembling a sectarian agenda inside Mosul. . . . Observation inside Mosul, however, reveals the frequent presence of Shiite sectarian symbols on vehicles of all units, including the Special Forces. Most ubiquitous among these are banners bearing the supposed visage of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of Muhammad and a figure of veneration for Shiites. . . .

It is important to understand that future developments—most importantly the defeat of IS, when it comes, as it will—are not likely to end the process of conflict in Iraq, but rather to usher in the next round. The underlying, stark dynamic of Iraq is one of fragmentation and sectarian politics. The effort to build a non-sectarian military presence in the form of the [elite] Iraqi Special Operations Forces has been partially successful, but it has not changed the bigger picture, and likely cannot.

Read more at American Interest

More about: Iran, Iraq, ISIS, Politics & Current Affairs, Shiites

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF