Since it first began fighting Islamic State (IS) in 2014, Washington has been conducting its campaign based on a series of assumptions: that IS poses the region’s most serious threat to the U.S.; that IS can be defeated by dislodging it from the key cities of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria; that the U.S. must cooperate with Russia and Iran in fighting IS; and that al-Qaeda in Syria is a secondary threat that can be contained by airstrikes. In a detailed report, Jennifer Cafarella, Kimberly Kagan, and Frederick W. Kagan argue that every one of these assumptions is false. Furthermore, they contend, although the Trump administration, by removing excessive restraints on attacking the enemy, has improved tactically on the approach of the Obama administration, it is maintaining the same flawed strategy.

Had the U.S. helped Iraqis and Syrians retake Raqqa and Mosul quickly in 2014, IS might well have collapsed. Retaking those cities three years later without a viable plan for what comes next will not have the same result. . . . IS holds other terrain in both [Iraq and Syria]. It will retain, most importantly, the ability to penetrate a Sunni Arab community that remains under siege even after its largest bases fall. IS is also actively exporting its vision and capabilities to external branches and transforming its idea of a caliphate from a physical one to a virtual, organized community that carries forward [its] objectives independent of the [central] organization. Defeating IS in Iraq and Syria may no longer be sufficient to defeat the global organization. . . .

Al-Qaeda, however, is more dangerous than IS. . . . Al-Qaeda has amassed an army in northern Syria, exploits vulnerable Sunni populations, and is poised to capitalize on IS setbacks on the battlefield. . . .

[Furthermore], the Obama administration’s actions amounted to a partnership with Moscow and Tehran. The blatant war crimes those regimes have committed in Syria have radicalized the Sunni Arab communities that IS and al-Qaeda prey on and control. The Sunni Arab community—the population critical to defeating Salafist jihadists decisively—now perceives the United States as complicit in a Russo-Iranian campaign to destroy it.

The Russo-Iranian coalition empowered by the previous administration has proved damaging in other ways. . . . Russia and Iran are building a regional order based on their shared near-term interests, which will not diverge any time soon. This developing system denies America the freedom to protect its own interests. The Russo-Iranian coalition will make it more difficult for the U.S. to respond to terror threats against it, defend key allies such as Israel, and ensure unfettered access to trade routes the U.S. economy depends on.

The report goes on to lay out a strategy for defeating Islamic State and al-Qaeda while reducing Russian and Iranian influence, through a gradual campaign based on building alliances with the local Sunni populations.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.