Benjamin Netanyahu visited Moscow earlier this month and met with Vladimir Putin to discuss the situation in Syria—his fourth such visit since 2015. By now, argue Zvi Magen and Udi Dekel, Russia has decisively tipped the scales in the Syrian civil war, successfully ensuring that the Assad regime will remain in place; what remains to be decided is whether, and how, the country will be divided once the fighting comes to an end. This question was most likely foremost on Netanyahu’s mind during his last meeting with the Russian president:

For its part, Iran still wants to see an undivided Syria under Alawite rule, and is therefore unhappy with what seems to be Russia’s policy in practice, i.e., the unofficial establishment of a type of federation in Syria that recognizes the country’s internal balance of power and grants a form of autonomy in regions having a dominant local power (e.g., the Kurdish province in the north or the Sunni enclave around Idlib). . . . At this point, Iran is cooperating with Russia, but is at the same time helping Assad expand his control of other regions; it also continues to provide arms to its key [military force in the region], Hizballah.

It is not entirely clear to what degree Russia is willing to take Iranian wishes into account, and there are points of disagreement between the two countries. Nonetheless, . . . Iran [has] provided the boots on the ground by mobilizing the main order of battle that allowed the pro-Assad coalition’s victories. Moreover, Russia has a broader range of interests tying it to Iran (energy, arms sales, trade, and more). . . .

[During Netanyahu’s most recent meeting with Putin], Israel stressed its displeasure with Iran’s dominance in Syria and the fact that Iranian forces and proxies seem destined to remain in Syria in any future arrangement. Moreover, Israel reiterated its red line: preventing the deployment of Iranian forces and the forces of its proxies in southern Syria near the Israeli border. This would seem to be the background for the March 16-17 aerial attack deep in Syria on a storage site serving Hizballah and/or forces subordinate to Iran. . . .

Russia views Israel as a regional power capable of affecting developments in the Syrian arena. It has proved [its desire to] avoid military friction with Israel . . . and is not opposed to strategic coordination with Israel about the future of Syria. . . . The big question now is to what extent Israel can . . . maintain its red lines and prevent the buildup of Hizballah and other Iranian proxies in Syria and the deployment of these forces near the border in the Golan Heights, without destabilizing its special relations with Moscow and without causing wider escalation in the northern arena.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.