Since Israel’s creation, the United States has kept its embassy to the Jewish state in Tel Aviv. The original rationale was to honor the clause in the UN partition plan, reaffirmed by resolutions passed in 1948 and 1949, designating Jerusalem a “corpus separatum” that would be part of neither the Jewish nor the Palestinian state. More recently, Washington’s excuse has been that it fears moving the embassy to Jerusalem—even to part of the city located in territory held by Israel before the Six-Day War—would unfairly prejudice the outcome of peace negotiations. None of this, writes Eylon Aslan-Levy, has prevented the U.S. or other Western nations from placing in Jerusalem their missions to the Palestinian Authority (PA)—whose government is situated in Ramallah:

None of the countries that have consulates in Jerusalem recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the city. Consequently, their official embassies remain in Tel Aviv. Their consulates in Jerusalem are, almost uniquely, accredited to no state. . . . Nevertheless, the Israeli Foreign Ministry treats them for all intents and purposes as if they were normal consulates accredited to the state of Israel. . . .

In general, consulates around the world concern themselves with gathering information and providing consular services. In contrast, the Jerusalem consulates are almost uniquely political. . . . The U.S. consulate says its job is to “help the Palestinian Authority build the sustainable institutions of a future independent, viable, democratic, and sovereign Palestinian state.” According to the former U.S. ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro, this political function means that “PA officials occasionally came to Jerusalem” [to meet with American diplomats]. . . .

These consulates’ jurisdiction covers the whole of Jerusalem [as well as] the West Bank and Gaza. Despite formally withholding recognition of any sovereignty over Jerusalem, the nine countries [who keep missions to the PA in Jerusalem] treat even west Jerusalem as part of the same jurisdiction as the whole of the West Bank. Eugene Kontorovich of Northwestern University Law School argues that this situation is incoherent. Originally, the corpus separatum extended as far south as Bethlehem and as far east as Abu Dis, but the international community now treats these areas as “occupied Palestinian territory” rather than as part of a Jerusalem whose future will be decided through negotiations between the two sides. . . .

None of the relevant foreign ministries was willing, when asked, to address the obvious contradiction raised by this claim: all insist that there can be no embassy to Israel in Jerusalem because the status of the city must be decided through negotiations, but at the same time operate de-facto embassies to the Palestinian Authority in the same city.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.