On Friday in Gaza City, two men assassinated Mazen Fuqha: a high-ranking member of Hamas formerly imprisoned in Israel for his role in a 2001 bus bombing that killed nine; in 2011, he was released with dozens of other terrorists in exchange for the captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Although it is unclear who was responsible for Fuqha’s death, Hamas is blaming it on Palestinians collaborating with Israel. The question now is whether and how Hamas will respond, and where that response could lead. Yoni Ben Menachem writes:

Fuqha moved freely around Gaza without bodyguards, demonstrating the complacency of senior Hamas figures who were convinced that they were safe from any interference. This sense of security for Hamas officials has now been shattered. From now on, Hamas officials will begin to move around with armed escorts and security guards. . . .

Fuqha was released together with Yahya Sinwar, recently elected as the new Hamas leader of Gaza. Now, many view Sinwar as the next possible target. He is known for his radical line against Israel, and Fuqha’s killing poses a leadership challenge to Sinwar, who must now decide on a response against Israel. Until now, Sinwar had been very careful not to violate the cease-fire agreement, brokered by Egypt between Israel and Hamas after the 2014 Gaza war, . . . despite recent Israeli air-force strikes in Gaza in response to the firing of six rockets by Salafist-jihadist groups. . . .

The likelihood that Hamas will start firing rockets at Israel in response is low, since Hamas is busy with internal elections and rebuilding in Gaza. In recent days, the Palestinian government has begun to distribute $40 million, which Saudi Arabia has donated, to hundreds of families in Gaza to enable them to rebuild their homes that were damaged in the 2014 war. Rocket fire into Israel would result in a strong Israeli response and another round of fighting that is not currently in Hamas’s interest.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the military wing of Hamas will respond with terrorist acts perpetrated by its “dormant cells” in the West Bank against Israelis living there or inside the Green Line. This underlines the importance of tightening the security coordination between Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The Israel Defense Forces are preparing, in any case, for the possibility of attacks ahead of the Passover holiday, and now it is essential to be vigilant.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.