The looming crisis with Pyongyang, writes Alan Dershowitz, demonstrates the dangers of the nuclear agreement with Tehran:
The deal signed by Iran in 2015 postpones the Islamic Republic’s quest for a nuclear arsenal, but it doesn’t prevent it, despite [the] unequivocal statement in the preamble to the agreement that “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will [it] ever seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons.” Recall that North Korea provided similar assurances to the Clinton administration in 1994, only to break them several years later—with no real consequences. . . . The body of the agreement itself—the portion Iran believes is legally binding—does not preclude Iran from developing nuclear weapons after a certain time, variously estimated as between ten to fifteen years from the signing of the agreement. Nor does it prevent Iran from perfecting its delivery systems, including nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.
If we are not to make the same mistake with Iran that we made with North Korea, we must do something now—before Iran secures a weapon—to deter the mullahs from becoming a nuclear power, over which we would have little or no leverage.
Congress should now enact legislation declaring that Iran’s reaffirmation that it will never “develop or acquire nuclear weapons” is an integral part of the agreement and represents the policy of the United States. . . . [In addition], Congress should authorize the president to take military action against Iran’s nuclear-weapons program if it were to cross [specified] red lines.