Watching Swedish television report the truck-ramming attack in Stockholm last Friday, Annika Hernroth-Rothstein came to some disturbing conclusions:

The most common explanation of previous attacks around Europe has been that Islamic State was retaliating against countries with some sort of military involvement in the Middle East, but in this case we know that is not true. Sweden, famously anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian and infamously neutral in every great conflict, has done little to merit such retaliation, which means we must look at this another way.

While reporting on the attack, the reporters kept saying, “This is exactly the same method used in the attacks in France, Germany, and England.” I noticed that each time one country was carefully left out. Israel saw these attacks first, . . . but saying so would mean admitting that we are all victims of the same terrorism and must all [work] together to stop it. Coming to that conclusion would not only mean a dramatic detour from [current] Swedish policy on Middle East affairs but it would probably also result in an identity crisis, as Sweden would have to learn from its imaginary enemy—[Israel]—how to combat the real one at its door. . . .

[Instead], the probable outcome will be nothing more than a few vaguely supportive rallies in the name of love, while hate is let in through the back door.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.