Don’t Squander Arab Good Will on the Peace Process

Both Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump have suggested that renewed Israel-Palestinian negotiations could be aided by the involvement of Arab states friendly to the U.S. and Israel, including Persian Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia that have a growing unofficial economic and military relationship with the Jewish state. To John Hannah, this is precisely the wrong way to take advantage of improving ties between Israel and Arab countries:

While I agree wholeheartedly that a historic opportunity may now exist to advance relations between Israel and several of its Arab neighbors, it would be unfortunate to squander it in service of efforts to solve a maddeningly intractable conflict that has defied resolution for nearly 70 years—and whose current prospects for progress are probably as bleak as they’ve been in a generation. . . .

My main concern is with preserving the major strategic opportunity represented by Israel’s budding relationship with the Arab states. The fact is that the basis for that relationship rests entirely on the shared sense of danger that both now face from the radical Shiite theocrats of Iran, on the one hand, and the Sunni jihadists and Islamists of al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic State, on the other. On those issues, the countries’ views are largely identical. By contrast, when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, the differences over what would constitute an acceptable solution remain profound. . . . Does it really make sense to stress-test Israel’s incipient and still-fragile cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states on the one issue that remains the source of their greatest disagreement? . . .

Of course, it’s important to note that the promise of enhanced Israeli-Arab cooperation is greatest against the twin dangers—Iran and Islamic terrorism—that also happen to pose the most urgent threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In an age of multiplying crises and declining resources, rigorously identifying U.S. national-security priorities is more important than ever. From that vantage point, countering the Iranian and jihadist threats are clearly matters vital to the safety and security of the American people. But rushing once more into the breach to try to midwife the birth of a weak and divided Palestinian state that would likely be prone to terror and anti-Americanism? Well, perhaps not so much.

Read more at Foreign Policy

More about: Israel & Zionism, Israel-Arab relations, Peace Process, Saudi Arabia, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF