Over the past three years, Tehran has been exploiting the chaos in Iraq and Syria to expand its influence in the Levant, with an eye toward establishing at least one, and probably two, corridors under its control through which it can funnel weapons and troops. These corridors, writes Ehud Yaari, go from Iran, across both the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, through the Iraqi desert, into Syria and then to Lebanon, much of which is under the control of Hizballah, itself a proxy of the Islamic Republic. The endpoint is Israel’s northern border (free registration required):

The ultimate purpose of the corridors . . . is to expand Iran’s reach into the Golan Heights, with the goal of tightening the noose around Israel. The Iranians publicly express their keen interest in opening up the Golan front to their proxies, and high-ranking Revolutionary Guard officers are engaged there now in the establishment of a new militia—the Golan Regiment—partly composed of Palestinians residing in Syria. Ahmed Jibril, the veteran leader of the Iranian-sponsored Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, has been advocating such a move in the Golan Heights, a call that has also been echoed at various times by the official Syrian media.

Such a tactic would extend the current frontline in Lebanon between Hizballah and Israel all the way down to the Yarmuk River, where the Syrian-Jordanian-Israeli borders meet. Leaders of some Iran-sponsored Iraqi militias . . . are already talking openly about their intention to move their forces to the Golan front. Israel has retaliated several times to attacks coming from that region, and one Iranian general was killed during those clashes.

In responding to Iran’s plan to secure influence in the Levant, the Trump administration should work with its regional counterparts to thwart Iran’s attempt to build these two corridors. Turkey, a NATO ally, should be encouraged to resist Iran’s efforts to dominate, through the corridors, the main trade routes [bearing] large amounts of Turkish exports to the Arab world. The Kurds, both in Iraq and in Syria, should be provided with military equipment to face the [Tehran-backed] Shiite militias. . . . The United States should back Israel’s effort to prevent the Iranians from securing a foothold on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. But above all, the United States should continue talking with Russia and insist that sooner rather than later, the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad will have to go.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.