A Gas Pipeline Connecting Israel to Italy Could Change the Near East

Since January of last year, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus have been working to create a pipeline that could transport natural gas to Europe from the reserves in Israeli coastal waters; Italy joined the negotiations two months ago. If this initiative, which is technically difficult and expensive to implement, does not pan out, Israel will be forced to choose between the less desirable options of cooperating with either Egypt or Turkey. George Tzogopoulos writes:

Turkey will not be considered a reliable partner by Israel for as long as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan dominates the political sphere, despite the rapprochement achieved last summer. Israel also has reservations vis-à-vis Egypt: the growing Russian role in Egypt’s energy sector cannot be ignored.

If the EastMed project, [as the proposal is being called], develops, it will certainly improve Israel’s relationship with the EU. Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete has said construction of this pipeline would contribute to the reduction of Europe’s dependency on Russian energy, a potential result also viewed with favor by the U.S.

The traditional division among EU member states regarding their view of Moscow can work in EastMed’s favor. While Germany is looking favorably toward the Nord Stream 2 [pipeline], which will complement Nord Stream 1 in the transporting of Russian gas to Europe under the Baltic Sea, the EU might well emphasize energy security instead and push (with the support of the U.S.) for the realization of EastMed.

Israel is the driving force for energy development in the eastern Mediterranean, and its choices on this matter will have serious implications in terms of both strategic calculations and long-term economic planning. By cooperating with trustworthy democratic countries, Jerusalem will be able to mitigate the risk of instability, secure clients on the Continent, strengthen its relationship with the EU, and improve its image in Europe.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Cyprus, European Union, Greece, Israel & Zionism, Israel diplomacy, Israeli gas, Italy

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF