On June 5, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt severed relations with Qatar over its support for Islamist groups (including Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood more generally), its pro-Iranian stance, and the positions endorsed by its state-controlled news network Al-Jazeera. The Gulf states have had tense relations with Doha since Hamad al-Thani—who ruled Qatar until 2013, when he abdicated power in favor of his son—became the country’s emir in 1995. Lee Smith comments on America’s proper role in the spat:

[T]he central purpose of Al-Jazeera [was] to serve as an instrument with which Hamad attacked his larger and richer Gulf neighbor. Internationally, the satellite network is known for its anti-American posture. After 9/11, it was virtually Osama bin Laden’s bulletin board, posting videos the al-Qaeda leader sent to the network through couriers. During the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq, Al-Jazeera openly sided with the remnants of Saddam Hussein’s forces as they targeted American troops and allies.

From Doha’s vantage point, though, beating up on the Americans was just another way to target Washington’s local client, Saudi Arabia. The Qataris have no real problem with the United States—they host al-Udeid, the biggest American military base in the Middle East and CENTCOM’s headquarters in the region. But that’s the Qatari way, playing both sides—making nice with the Americans and also with the people, whether Sunni or Shiite, who want to kill Americans is just another day at the office in Doha. Similarly, Qatar shares with Iran the world’s largest natural gas field, South Pars, the source of nearly all of its revenue, so it’s cozy with Tehran even as its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) see Iran as threat. . . .

[In breaking relations with Qatar], the Saudis aimed to show the Americans that they can be helpful. . . . What the Saudis don’t need is an argument over who funds terror. . . . The reality is that there are plenty of problematic actors in the GCC, including the Emiratis, who do business with Iran and have sheltered figures from the Syrian regime that the Saudis and Qataris oppose. . . .

What’s most important . . . is that the administration doesn’t let local players, whether that’s Qatar or the UAE or Saudi Arabia, set American priorities. Intra-Arab conflict should not distract the administration from keeping its regional partners focused on the two key issues on the U.S. agenda— stopping Iran and crushing Islamic State.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.