For the past eighteen months, Israel’s ultra-Orthodox parties have succeeded in holding up the implementation of a compromise approved by the Netanyahu government that would create a mixed-sex prayer area at the Western Wall. Yesterday, ḥaredi members of the cabinet, with minimal opposition, managed to “freeze” the plan by threatening to leave the governing coalition. Counting himself among those angered over the failure of this compromise, Shmuel Rosner gives some sober advice to those who feel similarly. To Rosner, the underlying fact is that ḥaredi politicians have significant electoral clout and believe this issue to be of the utmost importance; few Jews in the Diaspora, and even fewer in Israel, feel the same way:

Do not confuse the interests of small groups in Israel with those of large groups in the U.S. I have enormous respect for the dedication and determination of Women of the Wall. I still wonder if their cause—the cause of relatively few women—justifies the means—a rift separating millions of Jews from one another. . . .

The prime minister might be a coward for not testing how far the Ḥaredim will go in their insistence on killing the compromise. But it is not surprising that most of those thinking he should have taken the risk are also those who don’t want his government to survive. . . .

Do not try to convince Israelis—not even me—that the Western Wall issue is the most urgent issue on Israel’s agenda. It is not. . . . [Most non-ultra-Orthodox] Israelis dislike the [official] rabbinate and have little respect for ḥaredi leaders. They are less willing to fight for the Wall compromise not because they fear the rabbis or do not [believe] that the rabbis hurt Israel. They do not fight for the Kotel because it is not important enough for them to fight for. Also note that the rabbis are generally smart: they don’t take away from Israelis those things Israelis truly value—such as soccer on Saturdays.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.