The Myth of the Lone Wolf Terrorist

While the term “lone wolves” suggests terrorists who have had no contacts with terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS), almost of all the perpetrators of recent attacks in Europe, Israel, and the U.S.—even those described as “lone wolf” attacks—were in direct communication (usually online) with recruiters and with Islamists in their own communities. In fact, writes Julie Lenarz, a web of connections links perpetrators of jihadist terror in France and Britain over the past five years. Lenarz argues that describing these perpetrators as “lone wolves,” despite ample evidence to the contrary, has the benefit of helping to disguise a real problem:

Even if we were to leave aside for a moment the practical nature of terrorist attacks, it would be wrong to characterize them on an abstract level as a series of isolated incidents. An individual might act completely isolated from any external network, and yet he would still be linked to the global Islamist insurgency. . . . It is important to understand the character of an insurgency. It is a movement that does not necessarily require a centrally planned or coordinated effort. But it cannot exist without a common denominator that creates a sense of belonging by ideologically connecting individuals. . . .

The “lone-wolf” paradigm . . . allows politicians to escape thorny cultural and political discussions. By pushing the narrative that an individual has acted alone, his act of violence is isolated from the extremist ideology that forms the backbone of groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda and, in return, does not raise difficult questions about how the violence we experience is linked to Islam. . . .

The “lone-wolf” myth also helps security services, which are overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of information, explain serious failures in intelligence that might have prevented an attack from taking place. Intelligence officers have identified 23,000 jihadists roaming freely in the UK. Due to capacity constraints, however, only 3,000 of them can be permanently monitored. Unlike terror cells that need to meet, or at least have members communicate with each other, lone wolves can operate without leaving behind any traces and are difficult, often impossible, to catch. But true “lone wolf” attacks are extremely rare, and in most cases there would have been information that intelligence services could have acted upon. . . .

Individuals who carry out an attack are often only the tip of the iceberg. They do not operate in a social vacuum and seldom act in complete isolation. If we are serious about getting at the roots of international terrorism, we must first acknowledge the true nature and magnitude of it.

Read more at Tower

More about: ISIS, Politics & Current Affairs, Radical Islam, Terrorism

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF