Islamic State May Be on the Defensive, but the Ideology behind It Is Not

While Islamic State (IS) is rapidly losing ground in both Iraq and Syria, and its crucial strongholds of Raqqa and Mosul seem poised to fall, its animating Salafist-jihadist doctrines are as strong as ever. Already, IS has spawned affiliates from Southeast Asia to Africa and has coordinated and inspired terrorist attacks in the West. To make matters worse, al-Qaeda has been biding its time and preparing to stage a comeback. Yoram Schweitzer argues that the American-led coalition must ensure stability in order to prevent Islamic State’s resurgence:

Despite the bitter personal and inter-organizational conflict between Islamic State and its partners on the one hand and al-Qaeda and its affiliates on the other, and the disputes concerning the correct strategy for realizing their shared vision of establishing the Islamic caliphate—as expressed in venomous rhetorical exchanges and sometimes also in violent clashes between the two sides—what they have in common is still much greater than what separates them. Furthermore, it is likely that as the international pressure against IS and al-Qaeda increases, the chances of a rapprochement between them will also grow.

The deaths of [some] Islamic State leaders . . . raises the possibility that all the organizations in the Salafist-jihadist camp will combine forces. Therefore, although a formal reunion between Islamic State and al-Qaeda appears unrealistic, local ad-hoc cooperation between groups and terrorist networks, and even more, movement of operatives or organized units across and within the various groups identified with this ideology, can certainly be expected. . . .

[It is the likely] intention of the Salafist-jihadist movement to suspend the caliphate idea temporarily and replace it with the establishment of “emirates” in territories where the movement [already] has a presence and there are existing problems with national government structures. Therefore, in addition to a focused military campaign against organizations, networks, and activists who are part of this ideological movement, action—involving close international cooperation in political, economic, diplomatic, legal, and educational aspects—should be taken in order to prevent the threat of terrorism by this movement from reappearing and expanding.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Al Qaeda, ISIS, Middle East, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy, War on Terror

 

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security