The 2015 nuclear deal—known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—ended a number of sanctions on Iranian aviation, allowing Tehran to upgrade and expand its fleet of planes and related facilities. On average, eleven flights every week—mostly on ostensibly commercial airlines—now leave the Islamic Republic for Syria bearing arms, supplies, and soldiers to support Bashar al-Assad against his enemies. Iran will continue buying new parts and aircraft unless President Trump takes action. But doing so, explains Emanuele Ottolenghi, presents him with a dilemma:

Given the Iranian civil-aviation industry’s involvement in the Syrian airlift, it is in the interest of the U.S. to impose sanctions on that industry to prevent Iran from exploiting global commerce to aid its illicit activities. But, simultaneously, the end of longstanding U.S. aviation sanctions against Iran has opened the potentially lucrative Iranian market to U.S. manufacturers. Boeing insists that its $16.6-billion deal with Iran Air, and possible future deals between the U.S. aviation industry and other Iranian airlines, means that tens of thousands of U.S. jobs are now at stake. . . . [In actual fact, however,] Boeing has been outsourcing jobs overseas and laying off people as its assembly lines increasingly use automation to fulfill orders.

A multibillion-dollar business transaction is a powerful incentive against any re-imposition of sanctions. It also proves the hollowness of the argument made by JCPOA advocates in 2015 that the sanctions’ snapback mechanism would insulate the deal from Iranian cheating. The economic stakes make it much harder for any administration to reimpose sanctions on the strength of any but the most egregious violations. . . .

Proving Iran Air’s participation in a military airlift on behalf of [its military’s expeditionary wing], the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose goal is to sustain the Syrian slaughter and arm Hizballah, would make the airline eligible for renewed sanctions. Renewed sanctions would kill the big business deals signed with Iran Air and likely would trigger a chain reaction leading to the collapse of the entire 2015 agreement. . . .

U.S. reluctance to look into the mounting evidence of the Iranian aviation sector’s collusion with the Assad regime has only further emboldened the country at a time when the JCPOA has given its leaders additional financial resources to pursue their regional hegemonic ambitions. And this is one more reason why the Trump administration should suspend licensing for aircraft deals with Iranian commercial carriers while it conducts a thorough review of their role in the airlifts to Syria.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.