Israel Didn’t Lose by Removing Metal Detectors at the Temple Mount

Following a terrorist attack at the Temple Mount last month, Israel installed metal detectors at the entrance to the site, then removed them after Palestinian demonstrations and riots. Critics of the decision called it a dangerous concession that rewarded violence and empowered the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas. They also cited the official visit of Jordan’s king to Ramallah in the midst of the crisis as further bolstering Abbas’s standing, especially since Jordan joined in requesting the removal of the metal detectors. But Yaakov Amidror argues that Israel acted judiciously:

Israel is strong enough to deny Jordan’s requests for certain arrangements on the Temple Mount, but will its interests be better served by doing so and thereby prompting Palestinian riots that destabilize the Jordanian king’s regime? The logical answer is “no,” which is why Israel did well to grant the Jordanian request and ease pressure on its ally in the war on terror.

The real test [for Israel lies] not in placing metal detectors on the Temple Mount and plunging the area into chaos, but rather in devising a rational and thorough plan to counter the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement, which is really just the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood [and the primary instigator of the violence]. For too many years, the organization, outlawed in 2015, has been allowed to do whatever it wants on the Temple Mount, and the time has come to stop it. No one in Jordan or the Palestinian Authority would shed a tear if Israel curbs the movement and undermines its appeal.

This brings us to King Abdullah’s visit to Ramallah. . . . The fact of the matter is that the visit was another sign of Abbas’s weakness. It soon became clear that talks between Israel and Jordan led to the [concessions] on the Temple Mount, [not talks between Jordan and the PA]. Each side contributed its part. . . . In hindsight, it can be said that the events of the Temple Mount, serious as they were, had little effect on Israel’s relations with the Jordanians or the Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority remains as weak as ever, and Israel demonstrated maturity and responsibility and managed to maintain its strategic relations with Jordan.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Islamic Movement, Israel & Zionism, Jordan, Mahmoud Abbas, Temple Mount

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF