Now that Islamic State (IS) has lost the battle for Mosul, Iraq is preparing for a national election—which the Islamic Republic of Iran hopes will put a friendly government in power. To this end, Tehran is encouraging the Shiite political parties it has long backed to start billing themselves as liberal, non-sectarian, and wedded to a sense of Iraqi identity that transcends religious and ethnic divisions. Amir Taheri explains:

The apparent de-sectarianization of pro-Iran Shiite parties will make it difficult for Ayyad Allawi and other genuinely non-sectarian Shiite politicians, who are hostile to Iranian influence in Baghdad, to appeal to the Shiite majority on the basis of citizenship and uruqah [or “Iraqiness”].

The new de-sectarianization gambit will also put pressure on Kurdish parties at a time when some of them are campaigning for a referendum on whether to declare independence. It would be more difficult to sell the idea of an “independent” mini-state of Kurdistan to international public opinion at a time that Iraq is seen to be moving toward a non-religious democratic and pluralist political system. The gambit will also make it more difficult for Arab Sunni sectarians to garner support in the name of resisting a Shiite sectarian takeover of government in Baghdad.

But, Taheri continues, there is more to the ayatollahs’ plan, as is made clear by Iraq’s notoriously pro-Iranian vice-president, Nuri al-Maliki, during his recent trip to Moscow, where he invited Vladimir Putin to establish “a significant presence” in Iraq as a counterweight to the U.S.:

[Iran’s] strategy is to draw Russia into Iraq as a façade for Iranian influence. Iranian leaders know that the vast majority of Iraqis resent the emergence of Iran as arbiter of their destiny. Russia, however, is seen as remote enough not to pose a direct threat to the internal balance of power in Iraq. Yet, because Russia has no local support base in Iraq, it would have to rely on Iranian guidance and goodwill to play a leading role there.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.