The U.S. Has Undermined Itself by Cutting Aid to Egypt

On Wednesday, the American government announced that it was canceling or delaying some $300 million in aid for Egypt. The decision stemmed from a combination of Congressional attempts to tie aid to Cairo to improvement in human rights, the Trump administration’s desire that Cairo direct more of the military aid it receives to counterterrorism operations, and U.S. frustration over Egyptian relations with North Korea. While acknowledging that Washington is correct to demand more in return for its aid, Eric Trager argues the decision was made so clumsily as to be self-defeating:

Washington’s concerns regarding Egypt’s dismal human-rights record, poor counterterrorism performance, and relationship with North Korea are valid. But the scattershot nature of these conditions [on aid], and the fact that bureaucratic and political considerations drove this decision rather than any overarching strategy for U.S.-Egypt relations or the broader region, reflects a policymaking process in disarray.

Whereas previous administrations’ decisions on changes to aid were announced after they were communicated to the highest levels of the Egyptian government, key Egyptian officials learned of [the recent] decision only after reading the initial Reuters report. The aid cut also comes only weeks before the United States and Cairo are scheduled to resume the biennial Bright Star joint exercises, which have been redesigned at Washington’s urging to focus on counterterrorism after a four-year hiatus.

The rollout was also poorly coordinated within the U.S. government. Indeed, the new aid policy leaked just hours before a high-level U.S. delegation—including Trump’s senior adviser Jared Kushner, Deputy National Security Advisor Dina Powell, and the Middle East peace envoy Jason Greenblatt—landed in Cairo for a meeting with President Sisi. . . .

To be sure, the ultimate impact of the aid decision is ambiguous, since most of the affected funds might ultimately be disbursed. And the administration can ease the sudden confusion in the bilateral relationship by setting clearer conditions for allowing Cairo to spend the $195 million in military aid now being delayed. Still, the way in which Washington made and announced its decision has significantly undermined the Trump administration’s credibility with Cairo, which now has reason to question whether the president’s vocal support for Sisi matters.

At the same time, the decision is a wake-up call for the Egyptian government, which can no longer afford to ignore longstanding and widely held concerns within the U.S. policy community regarding its internal and external behavior if it desires a durable and supportive relationship with Washington.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Donald Trump, Egypt, Human Rights, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF