The U.S. State Department, along with numerous pundits, academics, and policy experts, has long believed that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prerequisite to improved relations between Israel and its neighbors, and will also lead to better American relations with the Arab world. While this theory of “linkage” has never been supported by much evidence, and has been entirely discredited in the past six years, Dennis Ross argues that its mirror image could lead, if not to peace, then to progress in that direction:

Benjamin Netanyahu can justify a move toward the Palestinians before his public and government if it is clear he is getting something from [moderate Sunni states], and especially the Saudis, that shows the region is responding to Israel. For Mahmoud Abbas, the Arabs can assume responsibility for the moves he makes. The problem is that the Arabs, in particular the Saudis, are not itching to play this role. . . .

[Thus there is a need for] what might be termed “reverse linkage”: it is not dealing with the Palestinian issue that will draw the Saudis closer to the United States; rather, it is the U.S. showing it will counter the Iranian threat in the region, even as it expects tangible Saudi moves on the peace issue, that can elicit active measures in support of the Trump administration’s efforts. Yes, the Saudis would still need Israeli moves toward the Palestinians to explain their outreach to Israel to their own and other Arab publics, but the [real motivating force] for them would be seeing that the U.S. is serious practically, not only rhetorically, in limiting Iran’s destabilizing moves in the region. . . .

The Saudis could [then] be asked to announce that they will send a delegation to Israel to discuss common threats in the region and security assurances. . . . In return, Israel could announce that because of its commitment to two states for two peoples, it will not build outside the settlement blocs and will forswear sovereignty in the areas that are east of the security barrier—or what amounts to 92 percent of the West Bank.

[Next], the Saudis and others . . . could join the U.S. in pressing [the Palestinian leadership] to stop seeking to delegitimize Israel in international forums; to end preferential welfare payments to the families of those who engage in violence against Israelis; and to recognize that there are two national movements and national identities—Jewish and Palestinian—which is why they accept two states for two peoples.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.