If the U.S. Decides to Reimpose Sanctions on Iran, Its Allies Will Come Around

Oct. 10 2017

Reportedly, President Trump is considering decertifying the nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic before the October 15 deadline, a move that would allow Congress to renew sanctions. Conventional wisdom has it that such sanctions will fail, since their success depends on the cooperation of American allies who will be much less willing than previously to go along. Citing the example of the 2011 legislation sanctioning Iran’s central bank—passed by Congress over the objections of the Obama administration—Richard Goldberg disagrees:

In a closed-door meeting, then-Deputy National Security Adviser Denis McDonough, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Neal Wolin begged and pleaded with the senators [sponsoring the legislation] to withdraw [it]. The United States would not be able to force its allies to go along with the plan, they said—the sanctions regime would fall apart, there would be global outrage and resistance, and gas prices would skyrocket. . . .

[However], every European and Asian ally that had come to Capitol Hill to lobby against [the 2011 sanctions bill] fully complied with it after it came into force. The measure was such a success that President Barack Obama claimed credit for it in his 2012 reelection campaign.

This wasn’t the first time that economic consultants, U.S. businesses, and both European and Asian allies opposed a unilateral congressional sanctions measure—and it wasn’t the last, either. But every time, history proved them wrong. . . .

Today, we are seeing the same old opponents of tough sanctions on Iran come out of the woodwork to warn President Donald Trump against threatening to reimpose a global financial embargo on Iran. Despite Iran’s refusal to allow inspections at military sites, continued testing of advanced ballistic missiles, expansion of its terrorist proxy armies into Syria and Lebanon, and holding of American hostages, former Obama administration officials argue that the United States has no choice but to keep its most powerful sanctions options in a lockbox for fear of European and Asian noncompliance.

Their arguments ring as hollow today as they did in the past. European and Asian businesses will oppose the reimposition of sanctions on Iran right up until the point they are reimposed. And then their lawyers will force them to comply—choosing continued access to the $19-trillion American financial system over Iran’s $400 billion.

Read more at Foreign Policy

More about: Donald Trump, Iran, Iran sanctions, U.S. Foreign policy

Hamas Sets Its Sights on Taking over the PLO

Oct. 20 2017

Examining the recent reconciliation agreement between the rival Palestinian organizations Fatah and Hamas, Eyal Zisser argues that the latter sees the deal as a way to install its former leader, Khaled Meshal, as head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and thereby the Palestinian Authority. It wouldn’t be the first time something like this happened:

Even the former Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat . . . took the PLO leadership by force. His first steps, incidentally, were with the Fatah organization, which he cofounded in January 1965 in Damascus, under Syrian patronage. Fatah was meant to serve as a counterweight to the rival PLO, which had come into existence [earlier] under Egyptian patronage. Arafat, however, was relegated to the sidelines in the Palestinian arena. It was only after the 1967 Six-Day War that he exploited the resounding defeat of the Arab armies to join the PLO as the leader of Fatah, which led to his gaining control over [the PLO itself].

Meshal [most likely] wants to follow in Arafat’s footsteps—a necessary maneuver for a man who aspires to lead the Palestinian national movement, particularly after realizing that military might and even a hostile takeover of [either Gaza or the West Bank] will not grant him the legitimacy he craves.

It is hard to believe that Fatah will willingly hand over the keys to leadership, and it is also safe to assume that Egypt does not want to see Hamas grow stronger. But quasi-democratic developments such as these have their own dynamics. In 2006, Israel was persuaded by Washington to allow Hamas to run in the general Palestinian elections, thinking the Islamist group had no chance of winning. But Hamas won those elections. We can assume Meshal will now look to repeat that political ploy by joining the PLO and vying for its leadership.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Fatah, Hamas, Khaled Meshal, Palestinian Authority, PLO, Politics & Current Affairs, Yasir Arafat