Riyadh’s announcement last week that it will begin issuing drivers’ licenses to women, writes Andrew Bernard, is very much in tune with the kingdom’s larger plan for economic and social reform known as “Vision 2030.” But, he argues, the change that’s really needed in Saudi Arabia requires steps that the country’s rulers seem unwilling to take:

The driving ban is one of many examples where Saudi Arabia is going to have to carry out reforms that Saudis regard as radical but that are already taken for granted virtually everywhere else in the world. . . .

Vision 2030 can basically be summarized as “Be more like the United Arab Emirates.” . . . Unfortunately, it’s an example that Saudi Arabia will likely find impossible to emulate. One critical element of the UAE’s success, for example, has been in drawing 15 million tourists each year. . . . Leaving aside that alcohol is banned in Saudi Arabia, leaving aside that men and women can’t bathe together in Saudi Arabia, leaving aside all of the other reasons why tourists would obviously prefer to go the UAE, or Jordan, or Israel among all of Saudi’s would-be tourism rivals—Saudi Arabia does not issue tourist visas. . . .

Saudi Arabia’s reticence to enact even basic social reforms calls into question the viability of the entire economic project. All of that is before considering those reforms that would also require real investment, like overhauling the kingdom’s abysmal education system.

Americans might balk at the notion that this is their concern. . . . But American support for the Saudi monarchy, repressive as it is, has always been predicated on the fact that Saudi Arabia without the monarchy would probably be even more religiously radical and dangerous to American interests.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.