After Iraqi Kurds overwhelmingly voted for independence in a recent referendum—but absent an actual declaration of independence—Iraqi government forces invaded Kurdistan. Since the fighting began on Sunday, Kurdish resistance has all but collapsed and Kurdish fighters have abandoned Kirkuk and other important cities. Fighting alongside Iraqi federal forces were several Iran-backed Shiite militias, and Qasem Soleimani, who commands Iranian troops fighting abroad, reportedly came to Iraq to supervise operations. All this is bad news for the United States, argues Ranj Alaaldin:

Since 2014, Iranian-backed Shiite militias have filled much of the vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi army. As part of a broader umbrella militia organization known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, they have played a central role in the war against Islamic State, which is why the United States has generally been content to appease and placate them. But for too long, Washington has turned a blind eye to the way these militias threaten Iraq’s stability by engaging in sectarian atrocities, participating in the deaths of thousands of Americans (and Iraqis), and infiltrating the Iraqi political system.

That should end now. As the dust settles from the war against Islamic State, the United States can no longer sit on the fence. The Shiite militias have many Iraqi rivals—not just the Kurdish Peshmerga, but also Arab Sunnis and moderate Shiite factions, tribes, and clerics who do not wish to see Iraq fall further into Iran’s orbit of influence—who deserve America’s support, not least because they support an Iraqi political order that is ultimately in America’s own interests. . . .

Washington can recover and regain its foothold in Iraq. It needs to establish red lines in the region that Tehran is not allowed to cross, under the threat of U.S. intervention against Tehran’s proxies and interests and under the threat that Washington may provide Kurdish forces with the weapons and training to act as an effective counterweight to Iranian power. . . .

When the United States pulls out of the Middle East, its enemies end up filling the vacuum. That’s what happened in 2011, when Iran saw its influence skyrocket in Baghdad after the U.S. troop withdrawal. Tehran not only gained a greater stake in Iraq, it also gained a free hand to extend its resources and proxies into the ensuing civil war in Syria, where Tehran has secured the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. . . . In northern Iraq, however, the United States has an opportunity to level the playing field.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.