Why Did Israel Fail to Heed the Warning Signs of the Yom Kippur War?

In the months and weeks leading up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Israeli intelligence had ample evidence—from a highly placed source in Egypt, to visual data, to warnings from the king of Jordan himself—that Cairo and Damascus were planning to attack. Yet its leaders chose to ignore the warnings, thus finding themselves caught dangerously off guard. Bruce Riedel, whose work for the CIA brought him into close contact with key players in the story, seeks to understand what went wrong, and argues that Jerusalem made similar mistakes in the First Lebanon War.

Israeli intelligence failed to see war coming in 1973 because it was wedded to a concept . . . that the Arabs would not go to war because they would lose, therefore the danger of war was minimal. All indicators of war preparations and any warnings of war were fed into the concept and then explained away. But the concept was not just an intelligence concept, it was a policy concept that the Israeli political leadership at the top deeply believed.

But more than the concept was in error. The Israeli intelligence community and the Israeli policy community had created a small and intimate feedback loop in which their common assumptions about the enemy were never challenged. Moshe Dayan, a military hero of epic proportions, shared the fundamental assumption that the Arabs were incompetent with his intelligence advisers. Since then-Prime Minister Golda Meir relied on her generals entirely on military issues, she shared it as well. . . . The Americans proved to be no help, either. They too were mesmerized by the [Israeli] concept. . . .

The Agranat Commission, [formed by the Knesset to investigate the failures of the Yom Kippur War], recommended some organizational changes to prevent another disaster. This is always the default position of bureaucracies when intelligence fails: change the organizational flow chart, not the menu itself. . . . The theory was that having three organizations each independently study the data [produced by intelligence] and make estimates would diminish the chance of the concept going unchallenged. . . .

In Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli intelligence community relied heavily on its Christian ally, the Lebanese Forces [or Phalange], for intelligence about the complexities of Lebanese politics. For decades, Israel’s concern in Lebanon had been the Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Syrian occupation army, while Lebanese politics and society were not a priority. For understanding this arena, the Israelis turned to the Lebanese Forces.

Overreliance on the Christians led Israeli analysts and policymakers to create a new concept, Riedel argues, that proved equally flawed:

[T]he bureaucratic solution of the Agranat Commission—creating a rival analytic service to the [IDF’s intelligence wing]—failed in Lebanon because the [military-intelligence analysts] would not challenge the “concept” and warn that the Phalangist viewpoint was flawed. . . . [T]he “concept” of Christian primacy in Lebanon failed to recognize the nascent power of the Shiite community and its capacity to create a strong insurgency against the IDF occupation of half the country. In particular, the military intelligence and the Mossad were very slow to recognize the rise of Hizballah.

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More about: First Lebanon War, Golda Meir, Israel & Zionism, Israeli history, Mossad, Yom Kippur War

No, Israel Hasn’t Used Disproportionate Force against Hamas

Aug. 15 2018

Last week, Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza launched nearly 200 rockets and mortars into Israel, in addition to the ongoing makeshift incendiary devices and sporadic sniper fire. Israel responded with an intensive round of airstrikes, which stopped the rockets. Typically, condemnations of the Jewish state’s use of “disproportionate force” followed; and typically, as Peter Lerner, a former IDF spokesman, explains, these were wholly inaccurate:

The IDF conducted, by its own admission, approximately 180 precision strikes. In the aftermath of those strikes the Hamas Ministry of Health announced that three people had been killed. One of the dead was [identified] as a Hamas terrorist. The two others were reported as civilians: Inas Abu Khmash, a twenty-three-year-old pregnant woman, and her eighteen-month daughter, Bayan. While their deaths are tragic, they are not an indication of a disproportionate response to Hamas’s bombardment of Israel’s southern communities. With . . . 28 Israelis who required medical assistance [and] 30 Iron Dome interceptions, I would argue the heart-rending Palestinian deaths indicate the exact opposite.

The precision strikes on Hamas’s assets with so few deaths show how deep and thorough is the planning process the IDF has put in place. . . . Proportionality in warfare, [however], is not a numbers game, as so many of the journalists I’ve worked with maintain. . . . Proportionality weighs the necessity of a military action against the anguish that the action might cause to civilians in the vicinity. . . . In the case of the last few days, it appears that even intended combatant deaths were [deemed] undesirable, due to their potential to increase the chances of war. . . .

The question that should be repeated is why indiscriminate rocket fire against Israeli civilians from behind Gazan civilians is accepted, underreported, and not condemned.

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More about: Gaza Strip, Hamas, IDF, Israel & Zionism, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict