Don’t Expect a Saudi Ambassador to Jerusalem Any Time Soon

Last week, two of Saudi Arabia’s former government ministers—one now the secretary general of the Muslim World League and the other Riyadh’s ambassador to France—visited a Parisian synagogue. In October, a Saudi prince participated in a public discussion of Middle East politics with a former Mossad director at a New York synagogue. Elliott Abrams, noting that such things can’t occur without official approval, sees them as positive signs of change within Saudi Arabia but cautions against reading too much into them:

The Trump administration’s efforts to “fast-forward” Israeli-Saudi relations have not succeeded. . . . The [White House] was counting on Saudi and pan-Arab desire to help the Palestinians and help the “peace process” to overcome the Arab desire to avoid political danger, but that was an overestimation of the degree of Arab official concern about the Palestinians. Arab regimes do care about the Palestinians, but they care about themselves and their own political health far more.

Nonetheless, Abrams sees reason for optimism:

[The synagogue visit] is a small step, of course; this is not Sadat visiting Jerusalem to speak to the Knesset, an event that happened almost exactly 40 years ago (November 19, 1977). But it is not exactly nothing, either. It fits within a recent pattern that should be recognized and encouraged. [However], I think the Saudis are getting most of what they want from Israel in secret military and intelligence channels. I doubt they will take big risks by doing things in public that might bring significant attacks on them.

But they will do some things, and this [synagogue visit] is a potentially important one. . . . Given the growth of anti-Semitism in Europe and globally in recent years, having the Saudis publicly demonstrate respect for Judaism is a helpful and useful step—for Israel and for Jews. Let’s hope it is followed by more. If the Saudi ambassador to France can visit a synagogue, can the Saudi ambassador to Washington—who happens to be the king’s son? Can the head of the World Muslim League issue a strong and clear denunciation of anti-Semitism and all religious hatred? Can the Saudis cleanse their textbooks of anti-Semitic material? Such steps seemed ridiculous not so long ago, but these are questions that may seriously be asked today—with at least some hope that in future years the answer might be yes.

Read more at Pressure Points

More about: Arab anti-Semitism, Donald Trump, Israel & Zionism, Israel diplomacy, Israel-Arab relations, Saudi Arabia

 

Israel Just Sent Iran a Clear Message

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.

Read more at Jewish Chronicle

More about: Iran, Israeli Security