The Israeli delegation to the UN organized a reenactment on Tuesday of the historic 1947 vote in which the world body approved the plan to partition Palestine. On Wednesday, the UN General Assembly observed its “international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people”—in which, as Benny Avni puts it, the UN remembers “one of the only consequential decisions [it] ever took by celebrating those who rejected it.” Yet, Avni writes, although recognition from Turtle Bay has become a focus of Palestinian aspirations, it is hardly a sufficient condition for statehood:

Long before partition, the Zionists had competing political parties, active and effective workers’ unions, universities, and scientific research institutes. A free press thrived, a budding legal system developed, and, [despite] early fights among Jewish militias, a united army under civilian control was formed as soon as independence was declared.

It wasn’t at all perfect. Nothing is. But the Zionists weren’t promising to be a stable democracy sometime in the future. They were demonstrating one right then and there. Not so the Palestinians. They’ve been declaring a state forever, but their pursuit of UN recognition has put the cart before the horse. . . .

In Palestinian-controlled West Bank cities and in Hamas-ruled Gaza, political differences are resolved by force. Armed groups violently compete with each other. The powers-that-be control the legal system. Corruption is rampant. Dissent is suffocated. The Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas is nearly a decade past the end of his one elected term, yet he still wields power.

The United Nations, the Arab League, the Saudi plan, President Trump’s new peace deal, BDS, or any other BS—none will create a Palestinian state. Only the Palestinians will, and they’re far behind.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.