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Mohammed bin Salman’s High-Stakes Gamble to Create a New Saudi Arabia

Nov. 14 2017

Since being named heir to his father’s throne, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has assumed significant power within the Saudi government and used it to position himself as a reformer. His boldest move so far came on November 4, when he ordered the arrest of over 40 princes and government ministers while playing a role in the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri of Lebanon. Hussein Ibish describe what he sees as the prince’s three-pronged effort to wipe the slate clean and “create a new Saudi Arabia for a new era”:

The first [prong] is the consolidation of political power. To all appearances, last weekend’s arrests pretty well conclude that chapter: there are no more viable, independent power centers in the country, or at least none that are not on existential notice. However, it’s possible the crown prince and his father have overreached and that there will be a backlash because they have jettisoned decades of carefully calibrated power-sharing within the royal family and other elements of the power structure. . . .

The second part of the project, economic and social reform, is a taller order, but still doable. . . . Mohammed has certainly shown a determination to lead this transition from the top down and a due appreciation of the social changes, particularly with regard to the role of women, that will be necessary for a globally competitive post-petroleum economy. His attempt to forge an alliance with the general public, especially the youth, so far appears relatively successful and could be a key basis for long-term success. There is evidence of an emerging new dynamism in parts of Saudi society.

It is the third front that is likely to be most challenging: the assertion and defense of Saudi interests throughout the Middle East, particularly with regard to an ever-more-powerful Iran. . . . Hariri’s resignation is likely tied to significant gains made by Iran and its key ally, Lebanese Hizballah, in securing, along with their Iraqi allies and clients, key areas in northern and western Iraq (in the aftermath of the Kurdish independence referendum and the battle against Islamic State) and in eastern Syria. . . . These developments are a potential strategic game-changer in the Middle East, and the Saudi response, apparently, is to go after Iran and Hizballah in their central and original locus of power in the Arab world: Lebanon. . . .

By positioning himself as an all-powerful incoming monarch, . . . Mohammed is gambling everything on relative success on all three registers: political power, socioeconomic reform, and foreign policy. While most Saudis seem to understand the pressing need for radical change, and many may currently support the crown prince’s measures, the danger is that a perceived significant failure on any of these fronts could produce a crisis of legitimacy in an environment of such personalized authority. . . . Mohammed bin Salman—and therefore almost certainly Saudi Arabia as a whole—will either win or lose spectacularly.

Read more at Atlantic

More about: Lebanon, Middle East, Politics & Current Affairs, Saudi Arabia

 

In Pursuing Peace with Saudi Arabia, Israel Must Demand Reciprocity and Keep the Palestinian Question off the Table

Nov. 22 2017

The recent, unprecedented interview given by the IDF chief of staff to a major Arabic news outlet has fed the growing enthusiasm in Israel about the prospects of a peace treaty and mutual recognition between Jerusalem and Riyadh. Mordechai Kedar urges level heads and caution, and puts forward ten principles that should guide any negotiations. Most importantly, he argues that the two countries normalize relations before coming to any agreements about the Palestinians. To this he adds:

The most basic rule in dealing with the Saudis and their friends is that Israel must not feel that it has to pay anything for peace. . . . If the Saudis want to live in peace with us, we will stretch out our hands to offer them peace in return. But that is all they will get. Israel [has] been a state for 70 years without peace with Saudi Arabia and can continue being a state for another 7,000 years without it. Any desire for a quick peace (as expressed in the disastrous slogan “Peace Now”) will raise the price of that peace. . . .

[As part of any agreement], Israel will recognize the House of Saud’s rule in Mecca and Medina—even though the family does not originate from the Hejaz [where the holy cities are located] but from the Najd highland—in exchange for Saudi recognition of Israel’s right to Jerusalem as its historic and eternal capital city. Israel will recognize Saudi Arabia as an Islamic state in exchange for Saudi recognition of Israel as the Jewish state or a state belonging to the Jewish people. . . .

Israel will not allow incitement against Saudi Arabia in its media. In return, the Saudis will not allow anti-Israel incitement in Saudi media. . . .

It is important to keep the Americans and Europeans away from the negotiating table, since they will not be party to the agreement and will not have to suffer the results of its not being honored—and since their interests are not necessarily those of Israel, especially when it comes to the speed at which the negotiations move forward. The Americans want to cut a deal, even a bad deal, and if they are allowed into the negotiation rooms, they will pressure Israel to give in, mainly on the Palestinian issue.

Read more at Israel National News

More about: Israel & Zionism, Israel diplomacy, Israel-Arab relations, Saudi Arabia