Shortly after the recent terrorist attack in New York City, Governor Cuomo referred to its perpetrator as a “lone wolf,” a term frequently invoked after such incidents. Frederick W. Kagan finds the phrase “profoundly misleading,” not least because police have already been searching for an accomplice:

[One] impetus behind this now almost-instinctive denial of foreign terror connections comes from the Obama administration’s intensive efforts to sustain the notion that it had defeated al-Qaeda long after it had become apparent to careful analysts that this was not the case. This effort spawned the popular “lone-wolf” thesis. . . .

This matters because Americans must change the way they understand the terrorist threat at home. There will be an increasing number of people radicalized within the U.S., conducting attacks that are not directly ordered or controlled from overseas.

Eliminating terrorist safe havens in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Sahel [region of Africa] will not end the problem of domestic terrorism. But allowing them to continue to flourish will unquestionably make it much worse. Safe havens give groups places to develop and transmit the messages that radicalize people in the West, as well as to perfect and propagate methods of carrying out attacks. They are, above all, evidence to those who seek it that these groups and their ideas can win.

The anti-terror strategy we’ve been following for a decade—and which the current administration is largely continuing—is failing and must be replaced. Rather than dismissing the most recent attack as yet another “self-radicalized lone wolf,” and thereby separating it from the global Salafist-jihadist problem, let’s take it as a call to reevaluate our overall approach to the problem and find more successful ways to ensure the security of the American people.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.