The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), founded in 1949, provides social services and financial assistance to Palestinian refugees from Israel’s War of Independence—and their descendants. In every other case, refugee status is not inherited, and the number of refugees following a war eventually declines; but UNRWA will continue to support an ever-growing number of clients indefinitely. Richard Goldberg argues that the U.S. should stop funding the organization and demand that Palestinian refugees be treated like all others:

In truth, [UNRWA is] not a refugee agency but a welfare agency, which keeps millions of people in a permanent state of dependency and poverty—all the while feeding Palestinians an empty promise that one day they’ll settle in Israel. Yet the United States remains the agency’s largest single-state donor.

Unfortunately, every time Congress tries to expose the fiction of “the Palestinian refugee,” it runs up against a State Department fiercely protective of UNRWA and its mythology. In 2012, an amendment to the annual State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill asked the Obama administration a simple question: how many of the Palestinians currently served by UNRWA were personally displaced by the 1948 war?

The point was to confirm to the world that there is only a relative handful of true Palestinian refugees still alive who may be entitled to repatriation or compensation. The rest, the descendants, are impoverished Palestinian-Arabs who will either become citizens of a future Palestinian state or be absorbed by Arab host nations.

While an official report was eventually sent to Congress, its contents were kept classified to [prevent] the American public from knowing the truth. The Trump administration can take a giant step toward Middle East peace by declassifying that report, updating it, and formally adopting a definition for Palestinian refugees that makes a clear distinction between refugees displaced by the 1948 war and their descendants. . . .

Future funding of the agency should be tied to a clear mission of resettlement, integration, and economic self-sufficiency. A timetable and work plan should be established for UNRWA’s integration into the UNHCR (the UN’s refugee agency). Congress should put these conditions into the annual foreign-aid bill, giving Ambassador Nikki Haley the leverage she needs to force changes in the agency’s next biennial budget.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.